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PhD thesis paper

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**An Examination of the Royal Hungarian Interior Ministry's (1931–1935) –
department of law enforcement agencies, the subdepartment of public safety and the
subdepartment of administrative law enforcement, and their fields of expertise**

Thesis booklet

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- Justification of the choice of topic, the hypotheses of research, objectives

The subject of the title has so far been a 'terra incognita' in the field of Hungarian history. The thesis examines the period of Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer's first term as interior minister of Hungary (24 August 1931-4 March 1935). The objective of the research was to produce new scientific results through the analysis of the legal regulations which could provide a better understanding of how the Ministry of the Interior - during these crisis years of the Horthy era - sought to 'protect' the existing political system, maintain order and public security, and develop the various fields of expertise belonging to the studied subdepartments. Therefore, my most important aspect was to analyse the respective fields of expertise in the light of the decrees and circulars issued by the Ministry of the Interior. These specialised areas were the ministry's VII. department of law enforcement agencies (which focused on the police, gendarmerie and the river police), the VIII/a. subdepartment of public safety (which took measures to suppress anti-state movements, handled matters of assemblies and associations, press police, etc.) and the IX/a. subdepartment of administrative law enforcement (control of drug trade, traffic police, fire police, morality police, etc.). An important question, which I tried to answer, was what the overall 'balance sheet' and results of the Ministry of Interior under Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer were in the light of the individual departments, the individual subdepartments, and the overall results of all the cases and fields of expertise I examined. The study also examines how the austerity policy of these years was implemented in the selected areas, and what impact it had on these areas. I also examined how the Ministry of the Interior - through legislation in these fields of expertise - responded to the political opposition's activity. This doctoral thesis is an attempt to provide a nuanced, objective analysis of the subject from as many viewpoints as possible, taking into account all the positive and negative aspects of these years.

It is important to note however, that the thesis is not about the personal history experienced by the individual. Nor was it intended to describe and analyse interpersonal relationships inside the ministry. I did not investigate who made the decisions, who carried them out, etc. The psychological aspects of history aren't the subject of this research either. The designated fields of expertise of interior affairs are in the main focus, and the thesis is about the presentation and analysis of changes in the legal framework. It could be the subject of a future research to focus on the individuals when examining the same subject.

In my thesis, I have only written about measures and cases outside the competence of the Ministry of the Interior in cases when it was absolutely necessary. It should also be

pointed out, that the gendarmerie and the river police were under the management of two ministries, because the Ministry of Defence had several hidden powers in relation to these two bodies, which officially 'belonged' to the Ministry of the Interior. In this regard, I have not given a full account of the 'nature' of the military, defence-related measures in this area, since these, in fact, belonged to the Ministry of Defence. I have endeavoured to present and analyse the measures that fell within the 'real' competence of the Ministry of the Interior.

I will use the terminology of the fields of study in this thesis according to the terminology used in the first half of the 1930s. With one exception: where the term 'policing' can be applied to a particular discipline, I have also described it. Regarding the use of terminology in the text of the thesis, it should be noted, that if a particular term is incomprehensible to the modern, '21st century eye', I have made it understandable in brackets after the word, thus resolving any misunderstandings that could arise. The latter is necessary because the terminology used in the first half of the 1930s does not overlap totally with the terminology used today (early 2020s).

It is also important to point out that during the Horthy era the classification, and the numbers of the sub-departments I have studied changed within the Ministry of Interior. In this thesis, I have used the new system of the Ministry of the Interior's classification introduced in 1932.

- Structure of the thesis

In chapter 2 of the thesis, I analyse all the sources relevant to the topic. Chapter 3 presents the historiographical context. Chapter 4 gives a short account of the government policy of 1930's, but only in the fields specifically related to the topic of the thesis. Chapter 5 focuses on the financial affairs of the areas which I have examined. The need for the latter is explained by the fact that - for the sake of transparency - it was essential to provide a complete picture of the overall financial framework of all the fields of expertise which I have studied. Chapters 6-8 deal with the fields of expertise of the selected subdivisions. It also has subchapters, which contain a description of the competences of the respective fields of expertise, what happened before the years researched, and the essential elements of the legal regulations. These parts also present and analyse the policy measures taken by the Ministry of the Interior under the leadership of Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer. In chapter 9, there is the final summary, where I sum up and present the new scientific findings to the reader. Chapter 10

provides the reader with help regarding abbreviations, and Chapter 11 gives a complete list of the sources and scientific literature I used. Chapter 12 contains the annexes.

In relation to chapters 6-8, it is important to point out that there are some disproportions regarding the coverage of some topics. The latter can be explained by the fact that a relatively large number of changes took place in some areas, which require further explanation. Meanwhile, in a number of fields of expertise, there were no changes or only very few as well as minor ones -, which did not require a lengthy explanation.

- Research methodology

Using source criticism was very important for the review of the surviving relevant sources, including those from the government parties, from 'neutrals' and from the opposition parties of the time.

In addition to the records of the Ministry of the Interior from the period (most of them can be found in the Hungarian National Archives in the following sections: MNL OL – BM – K 148, K 149, K 150), I also conducted archival research among the records of other ministries and the Prime Minister's Office. The latter was necessary because of my assumption that these institutions communicated with each other relatively often, in the form of transcripts for example. I assumed that there might have survived some relevant sources in those institutions too. I have elaborated on this in more detail in chapter 2.

I have also conducted a thorough research of non-archival sources (gazettes, specialised press, publications of the Hungarian Parliament etc.). This research process covered all the sources expected to contain a 'usable' information. These are described in more detail in the chapter on Sources (2).

In all cases, I sought to check the credibility of the various data, reports, writings, etc. I have analysed the independent, unbiased results of the aggregated 'picture' - made by examining the sources and literature of the field in question - from as many angles as possible. I summed up the results obtained by each subdivision. My research was conducted from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives.

Some subchapters of this history thesis are also partly related to the fields of the history of law enforcement, the history of law, the history of public administration, political history, social history, and economic history.

- New results of the study

In connection with the subdepartments under study, I was the first researcher to examine and establish new scientific results regarding a number of fields of expertise during the first ministerial term of Keresztes-Fischer.

The new findings revealed by my doctoral dissertation (which I list below, and the main findings can be seen in bold letters) came from the sources, but the sources themselves are incomplete. For this reason, it is possible that if 100% of the source material had survived and it had been available during my research, some of the findings of my thesis could have been different.

The research has shown that during these years the police and the authorities did not adhere to some of the legislation. This phenomenon can be explained firstly by the fact that some of the legislation in force at the time in certain fields of expertise was relatively 'old'. Some of these legislation had in fact been 'forgotten' by the authorities and official bodies inferior to the Ministry of the Interior. This is particularly true to those older regulations, which were not in use day-by-day. The Ministry of the Interior had actually issued some 'reminder' decrees in order to remind the authorities about them. Secondly, it also occurred that a small number of regulations made previously were misunderstood by some of the authorities. Indeed, it can be established that in some cases, the previous legislator did not express itself clearly enough. Also, the work of lower authorities was made more difficult because of the serious problems caused by the great economic crisis, and it should be noted that during Keresztes-Fischer's ministership a very large number of regulations were issued. **In many cases, the Ministry of the Interior also issued 'clarifying' decrees to clear up some misunderstandings caused by previous regulations.**

Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer had four major tasks to complete when he took up the ministerial velvet chair in August 1931. The first was to step up austerity policy. The second was to rationalise the administration, the public security bodies and eliminate operational errors. These two tasks also had some common areas. The third task was to strengthen public security and the state order, and to tackle extremists in the country. And, while it is true that preventing the rise of a legitimate opposition was not an officially recognised objective, in practice it can also be seen as a fourth task.

Regarding austerity policy, the Interior Ministry has gone to the limit. It can be said that almost all budget expenditure has been cut to the point, until it was possible without significantly threatening the operation of public security services. That task has therefore been successfully completed. Of course, this also had a number of negative consequences. It is important to point out that the total monthly income of the Minister of the Interior (including various allowances, housing allowances, etc.) fell by almost 30% from the budget year of 1931/32 to the budget year of 1934/35. Thus, the ministers of the Gyula Károlyi government and the Gyula Gömbös government therefore also saved on their own income for the state. It is important to note however that Keresztes-Fischer and his ministry were on a forced course regarding austerity policy. They treated the issue as a 'necessary evil', and they knew it would cause many difficulties. If the Interior Minister had refused to cooperate with government policy, he would have lost his position. Istvan Bethlen, who still possessed enormous influence, Miklós Horthy, and all of the government would have supported the Interior Minister's replacement in that case. However, no source has been found to prove that Keresztes-Fischer's economic policy ideas actually differed from those of the government. It is likely that Keresztes-Fischer was also of the opinion that cutting government spending was the way for the country to survive the global economic crisis. However, it was not good for the Hungarian economy that the budget of the Ministry of the Interior did not help to improve the 'blood circulation' of the nation's economy.

In terms of material improvements of the ministry, only minor developments were made, which could be implemented with relatively small amounts of money. Thus, the Ministry of the Interior was less successful in this area during that period. However, the system remained operational despite its shortcomings and deficiencies.

Regarding the second task, the ministry was only partially successful. They took a step forward with the adoption of a number of new measures that made the administration more modern and cheaper. Some of the unreasonable procedures and operational errors have also been corrected, and the Ministry of the Interior has also resolved many of the jurisdictional problems between its own law enforcement bodies. In a number of fields of expertise, a couple of legal gaps and errors have been remedied. And, by transferring some minor competences to the second instance authorities, they managed to reduce the overload on the ministry. In this way, more capacity was available for more important tasks. The latter highlights the fact that Keresztes-Fischer was right to see that the efficiency of the Ministry of the Interior was improved if the minor and less important tasks were not carried out by the

second instance authorities. In this way, the Interior Ministry had more time for some more important affairs.

However, it should be noted that in some cases, the system remained bureaucratic in many respects. In these cases, the administration was not really fast, except when it was a priority case. There were also a number of problems in the field of home affairs that could not be solved while the global economic crisis affected Hungary. Many of these problems were unsolvable due to lack of money and time. In addition, the Gömbös government prevented Keresztes-Fischer from implementing his most important administrative reform plan (the full implementation of Act XVI. of 1933). For this reason, the Ministry of the Interior continued to waste its capacity on what were, in some cases, matters of minor importance. It is questionable what the drawbacks would have been if Keresztes-Fischer's administrative reform plans had actually been implemented. Of all the fields of expertise I examined, it is likely, that the IX/a. administrative police subdepartment would have been the most affected by the reform. This can be explained by the fact that the other subdepartments I examined had fields of expertise in which Keresztes-Fischer and the authorities saw it more efficient to have a centralised system. In any case, a highly decentralised gendarmerie or police force would have been unthinkable during the Horthy era. The interior ministers and the governments did not want to let these areas out of their hands. The lack of full implementation of Act XVI. of 1933 was therefore not a major problem for most of the subdepartments I have examined.

My research confirms the findings of scientific literature published before that this period can be described as mostly successful from the perspective of the state power, in terms of strengthening public security and law and order, and curbing extremist elements. In many cases however, professional, modern, effective, but sometimes brutal methods were used to persecute communists and the anti-government extreme right. In this respect, Keresztes-Fischer did his best. The police and the gendarmerie generally functioned effectively and carried out their basic duties.

If there were problems, they were usually not the fault of the Ministry of the Interior, the police or the gendarmerie. Instead, these were because of the bureaucratic Hungarian administrative system, the global economic crisis, a lack of financial resources and other bad circumstances.

My research also confirms prior findings that the government's actions against the anti-government forces in parliament was successful - from a state power point of view - in preventing the latter from gaining more strength. In some cases, the Ministry of the Interior made it difficult for the opposition to operate. In practice, restrictions on freedoms imposed

by the Ministry of the Interior were only partly for reasons of public security - as the government parties often claimed -, since their goal was partly to weaken the opposition.

The leading figures in the Ministry of the Interior (Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer, Aladár Boór, Béla Csatáry, Endre Kontz, etc.) were mostly hard-working, highly knowledgeable professionals who made relatively few mistakes from the point of view of state power. On the basis of the sources examined, it cannot be said that any conflict arose between Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer and the heads of departments or subdepartments which I have examined. The working relationship that had developed over the years between them seems to have worked well. The interior minister had almost maximum confidence in these persons. In this regard, the person and work of Béla Csatáry - who has carried out extremely complex and difficult work in the ministry - should be highlighted. The volume and diversity of the cases entrusted to him required a vast amount of legal knowledge and expertise in administrative police.

Meanwhile, criticisms towards the Ministry of Interior were only partly justified, especially in relation to criticisms by the political opposition. In the fields most attacked by the opposition - government measures against the opposition - it is not possible to determine how truthful the opposition narrative actually was.

Based on the considerable amount of source material reviewed, there was only one case in which a document got 'misplaced' in the Ministry of Interior. In general, those serving in these subdepartments worked very accurately and with a great deal of effort. And, according to some sources, the working morale of Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer has become almost legendary. The interior minister even ate his lunch in his office, in order to have more time for work.

In the Ministry of the Interior, the management of cases in the subdepartments I examined were mostly impeccable. The new system of the ministry introduced in 1932 proved to be generally effective.

In the case of the VII/a subdivision of police, I found that the management and finances of the police were professionally handled in general. Almost all items in the budget have been reduced to the extent, until which they could - without seriously endangering the police's capability to carry out tasks related to public safety.

Thus, the police administration was transformed in a way that did not reduce its professionalism. Interestingly, the policy of the minister in this area has been both centralised and minimally decentralised at the same time. Abolishing the district police headquarters and replacing them with a rural police headquarter meant centralisation. However, a small degree

of decentralisation could also be seen as minor matters were transferred from the ministerial competence to the second level authorities (police headquarters). The move was important because it allowed the police subdepartment of the ministry to devote more capacity to other - more important - tasks. The measures taken in this regard were therefore positive.

In the field of disciplinary cases, the regulations have made the system more professional and uniformized from a police's point of view. However, it should also be noted that - according to the political opposition's opinions at the time - in many cases some of the police officers who were actually guilty of anti-opposition measures were not prosecuted. In absence of evidence, it is not possible to establish the overall truth regarding this.

With regard to the VII/b. gendarmerie service subdepartment, it can be said that - apart from changes in the investigative service -, there has not been any really significant change in the organisation. For the most part, the organisational structure worked effectively. For this reason, there was no need for significant reform in this area. However, it can be considered as a minor shortcoming that the gendarmerie's investigation division command had the technical and financial capacity, staff expertise and appropriate organisation to provide criminal guidance to the ministry's public security service, but lacked the authority to do so. Meanwhile, the district police headquarters had the necessary authority, but lacked the necessary apparatus to act. This problem could have been solved at that time.

Similar to the minimal decentralisation measures seen in the police subdepartment, in the field of gendarmerie they also transferred some less important competence to the district headquarters. Thus, the policy of the minister regarding the gendarmerie was interestingly not exclusively in favor of a centralisation system, but instead seemed to tend to some minor decentralisation. This had the advantage of giving those in charge of the gendarmerie more time to deal with the more important, more significant matters, to be able to 'really manage' those ones. Both subdepartments of the gendarmerie had played a role in making minor changes to the organisation. These changes have made the institution slightly more efficient. In the first half of the 1930s, the gendarmerie was relieved of certain tasks. This was intended to ensure that the Corps was genuinely working to strengthen law and order, rather than dealing with minor matters that could be dealt with by other authorities.

The period can be characterised by professionalism in the field of management and finance too. The austerity policy has gone to the limit. The role of the Ministry of the Interior was significant here because with an excellent 'sense' they went to the very limit, thus maximising austerity, but without seriously compromising the efficiency of the institution (In the field of public security, the ministry basically performed well.). In the first half of the

1930s, there was a year when the gendarmerie was almost 30% more efficient than the metropolitan police of Budapest in terms of the rate of successful investigations. The gendarmerie's performance is also notable because, compared to earlier years (the ones before 1931), many of its officers worked for a smaller monthly income in more difficult circumstances, and the number of crimes increased, but - in spite of these - the crime investigation statistics did not deteriorate. The latter result was partially due to the commitment of those, who served in the force, towards their own job.

In the scientific literature published before, it has already been established that in the first half of the 1930s the Minister of the Interior was regularly criticised by the opposition who said that the gendarmerie regularly terrorised and harassed opposition members by brutal methods. **But from the contemporary documents that I have examined, I have not found any credible source that could prove the existence of any central order to use brutal physical violence and unlawful methods against the opposition. In the absence of evidence, it cannot be established how often these things really happened the way the opposition spoke about them. It is also not possible to determine how often minutes and reports were falsified in this type of cases.** It is possible that new information on this subject may emerge eventually in sources found in the Historical Archives of the State Security Service, but it's also important to note that relevant information could be hard to find there, and those reports could also be biased. Their credibility would also be questionable because the accused people may have been abused by the officers and their testifications may have been written under pressure or duress.

Most of the shortcomings and failures at the ministry can be traced back to the state's financial difficulties. As for other problems, in some cases the excellent experts of the Ministry of Interior were not able to solve a given problem (e.g. case of Roma people) because it was not solvable under the given circumstances in a humane way.

Regarding the the VII/c. gendarmerie personnel subdepartment, the real management activity of the Ministry of the Interior was essentially to 'force' them to be economical. The latter, of course, does not mean that one of the subdepartments was subordinate to the other, but merely that VII/b. had a greater role in financial decisions. Also, in the fields of training, secret documents, and on measures affecting the investigative service, there were steps which represented a major improvement.

It is also known that when newcomers to the police force were introduced as patrol officers, they often did not receive enough help. In this area, a measure would have been needed - and it would have been really possible to do this - to remedy this shortcoming.

In the field of disciplinary matters, no credible source has been found to prove that there was a central order or decree to falsify reports and minutes regarding measures against the opposition. It also cannot be determined to what extent the top management of the ministry had accurate and credible information on the various cases. If there were falsifications, it is also possible that they were not known to the top management. On the other hand, it is also possible that they were largely aware of the real events, but overlooked them intentionally.

Regarding the VII/d. river police subdepartment, it can be said that significant progress has been made in the area of river police competency problems. In addition to filling in the previous legal gaps, there were other positive innovations. In this way, the river police continued to function more rationally. On the basis of the sources examined, it cannot be said that there was any significant conflict between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence over the management of the river police. Some of the decrees issued by the subdepartment were of a nature that also served a military purpose.

The VII/e. financial subdepartment of the river police and other police bodies, it can be said that the financial and economic management was generally professional. There was no significant measure of the Ministry of the Interior to be mentioned in connection with the administrative subdepartment of the VII/f. The Ministry of Defence was the real manager of this body, and it's military and defence-related measures.

Regarding the VII. department of police forces, it is to be noted that mostly some of the measures relating to the gendarmerie and the police were the ones that had an impact on the operation of the other subdepartments (VII/a, VII/b, VII/c). The measures related to the river police were less likely to affect the other two public security bodies.

The VIII/a. public security subdepartment has also seen some improvements at the time. The most significant development has been in the field of expertise called 'policing, sale, keeping, manufacture, transport and documentation of arms, ammunition, gunpowder and explosives'. In some of the other fields, progress has mostly been minor. In the context of earlier legislation, some of those has been made clearer in this period in the fields of associations; deportations; and the policing, sale, keeping, manufacture, transport and documentation of arms, ammunition, gunpowder and explosives.

Financial austerity in the areas covered by this subdepartment was minimal compared to the other ones. In fact: **Keresztes-Fischer increased financial support for the fight against communism.** This fact also sheds light on which area was given priority over the others. The subdepartment was also responsible for the fact that no interior ministerial

measure has been taken to provide a fundamental solution to the issues raised by migration (there was a major internal migration during the economic crisis). However, it should be noted that, given the circumstances, no effective solution could have been found. In many cases, the measures taken by the bodies of VIII/a. subdepartment of public security had an impact on each other. The only exception is the field of press information which - by its very nature - falls into a slightly different category. Of the subdepartment's areas of activity, the weakening of the opposition has been mainly served by regulating associations, assembly and the right of assembly, and the actions of the press police. The fact that the policing, sale, keeping, manufacture, transport and documentation of arms, ammunition, gunpowder and explosives were transferred to this subdepartment in the early 1930s did not cause any problems. In fact, it has made this body more efficient. From the point of view of state power, the subdepartment has not made any major mistakes. However, the curtailment of freedoms was also a problem for people who did not actually threaten the state leadership.

The IX/a. subdepartment of administrative police and most of its bodies has experienced some measures taken by the Ministry of the Interior, which improved the functioning of some field of expertise. In my thesis, I have shown that the most significant improvements in terms of regulation have been made in the areas of the IX/a. subdepartment, namely traffic police, fire police, control of drug trade, control of alcohol sales and the so called Hungarian National Dancemaster Training Course. Minor progress has been made in the following areas: domestic servants, Roma people, industrial policing, morality police, radio, suicide cases, veterinary police, hunting, control of peddles, control of commercial measuring, the regulations of subdepartments, moral certificates, and other matters. There was no notable change in the following areas (which have improved the efficiency): housing police cases, the cases of found treasures, expropriation and possession cases, water rescue, policing fairs, construction and land division cases in large and small municipalities, and overruling expropriations in the mining sector.

The overload in this subdepartment was reduced by transferring a minor part of its caseload to the second instance authority. This measure has made the subdepartment more efficient.

Of the specialised fields of expertise covered by the subdepartment, there were 6 at which the financial 'austerity' has in many respects hampered a bigger development of the area: traffic police, fire police, rewarding of domestic servants, affairs of Roma people, morality police, and suicide cases. It can be considered a mistake, that – by means of regulation – it would have been possible to quicken the slowly working system, but this hasn't

been done. Another major shortcoming was the lack of an institutionalised, quick and simple procedure, which would have enabled immediate action to be taken against road traffic offenders without creating a significant workload for the authorities. The latter shortcoming could have been remedied at that time.

This subdepartment has served little purpose other than to make the political opposition's life more difficult. A significant number of the subdepartments I examined had an impact on some of the other ones. Exceptions include the cases of domestic servants, found treasures, and overruling expropriations in the mining sector.

Also, it is important to avoid generalisations and to avoid a black and white approach. The fields of expertise I have examined represent only a 'detail' of the activities of the Ministry of the Interior lead by Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer. There existed some major problems at the time that could have been solved, but Keresztes-Fischer's ministry did not act on them. At the same time, **the Ministry of Interior acted in a professional manner on most of the solvable problems.** Keresztes-Fischer consulted many experts on some plans regarding interior regulations, especially on the more 'complicated' draft legislation. But this also meant that the system, in some cases, functioned slowly. On the other hand, from a technical point of view, this made it possible to create a lot of high-level legislation. Therefore, it also had a positive side. In general it can be said that a number of dysfunctions were eliminated in the ministry and some fields of expertise were modernised.

Overall, it can be said that Minister of the Interior Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer and the sub-departments under investigation generally performed well and professionally - though not perfectly - from the view of state power at the time. Meanwhile, Keresztes-Fischer became one of the most hated politicians in these years from the point of view of the social democrats and the anti-government extreme right.

Keresztes-Fischer was characterised by good organisational skills, a great work ethic, a high level of professionalism and vigorosity. After listening to the opinions of others - when he saw the arguments of the other side as 'stronger' - he was prepared to abandon his original plan. He was capable of being self-critical. His statements and parliamentary speeches were logical and systematic.

To sum up, there are positives and negatives to be found in his time as interior minister. The way in which Keresztes-Fischer's interior ministry is judged depends on the perspective from which it is viewed. The range of measures and actions taken against the political opposition may be the subject of later historiographical discussions. My thesis has provided important contributions to the history of the Ministry of the Interior, the police and

the gendarmerie. Thus, the dissertation may also help in the preparation of a future biography of Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer.

- Publications of the author

Atilla Balogh: A Belügyminisztérium közlekedésrendészeti politikája Keresztes-Fischer Ferenc minisztersége idején (1932-1935). In: Koncz István – Szova Ilona (szerk.): A 15 éves PEME XVI. PhD - Konferenciájának előadásai. Budapest, Professzorok az Európai Magyarorszáért Egyesület, 2018, pp. 35-49.

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Atilla Balogh: A Keresztes-Fischer Ferenc vezette Belügyminisztérium takarékosági politikája a rendészet területén (1931-1935). In: Koncz István – Szova Ilona (szerk.) PEME XVIII. PhD - Konferencia. A PEME XVIII. PhD - Konferenciájának előadásai. Budapest, Professzorok az Európai Magyarorszáért Egyesület, 2019, pp. 18-34.

Atilla Balogh: A Keresztes-Fischer Ferenc vezette Belügyminisztérium tűzrendészeti politikája (1931-1935). In: KRE-DIT, Vol 5/2. (2022), pp. 1-22.

Atilla Balogh: A Magyar Királyi Csendőrség a nagy gazdasági világválság sújtotta Magyarországon (1931-1935). In: Rendvédelem-történeti Füzetek. Vol 31/61. (2023, waiting to be published).

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Atilla Balogh: Keresztes-Fischer Ferenc és a magyar állam kábítószer-politikája (1931-1935). In: Koncz István – Szova Ilona (szerk.): A 15 éves PEME XV. PhD - Konferenciájának előadásai. Budapest, Professzorok az Európai Magyarorszáért Egyesület, 2017, pp. 64-77.