Zsuzsanna Ildikó Rosonczy

RAPID RUSSIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR VIENNA IN THE SPRING OF 1849
The Circumstances and Consequences of the Dispatch of Panyutin’s Division

THESES OF A DOCTORAL (PHD) DISSERTATION

Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary
Budapest, 2015
The goal of the inquiry and the earlier historiography

On June 3 and 4, 1849, a Russian army division entered the city of Pozsony (today Bratislava in Slovakia) in two columns, coming from the city of Nagyszombat (today Trnava in Slovakia). They were welcomed to the city by Julius Jacob von Haynau, commander-in-chief of the Austrian Army. The Russian soldiers, who were under the command of lieutenant general F. S. Panyutin, arrived in the city roughly two weeks before the main body of the Russian army crossed the border into Hungary.

In this dissertation, I shed light on the circumstances of the dispatch of the army division and its arrival in Hungary. I examine the roughly six week period between the issue of the order to send the division into battle and the actual deployment of the soldiers against the Hungarian army. This period had a significant influence on the later development of the cooperative, collaborative relationship between Austria and Russia.

The secondary literature on Panyutin’s division indicates only that at the beginning of May (i.e. before the large-scale intervention had begun) it was dispatched by field marshal I. F. Paskevich, the commander-in-chief of the Russian army sent to support Austria in the struggle against the Hungarians, by rail to Ungarisch Hradisch (today Uherské Hradiště) in Moravia to provide immediate protection and relief for Vienna. From there, the soldiers in the division continued on foot to Pozsony. They were first used in action on June 21 in the battle of Pered, ensuring the Austrian Army numerical superiority and therefore victory in the struggle. At this point several questions arise.

If this division was sent to Ungarisch Hradisch in order to provide immediate assistance, why did it spend almost two weeks there before moving on? Furthermore, it was sent by rail, in other words by the most modern means of transportation available at the time, which clearly indicates that speed was a priority. The division departed in response to urgings from the Austrians, and yet for two weeks it did not budge from the small town in Moravia, in spite of the fact that the Austrian leadership strove to induce it to continue onward in its journey. Why the rush if, after having traveled to Moravia by rail, the division was to spend the time it had won “relaxing” in Ungarisch Hradisch? What took place in the course of these two weeks in the town? Does any trace remain in the history of the community of the time spent there by the Russian soldiers? If the division proceeded from Moravia to Hungary on foot, and this was Paskevich’s initial intention, then why did the Russian commander-in-chief –
who was known for avoiding unnecessary risks – not also send the cavalry as protection, given that the cavalry could also have been sent by rail at the time? Or did Paskevich really send the relief force to a destination (and in a manner of travel) in complete accordance with the requests of the Austrians? By what manner of transport did the service corps travel to rejoin the division? How were the troops transported by train between Cracow and Ungarisch Hradisch, given that the trip took them into Prussian territory? And what place does this instance of military transport occupy in the history of the railways in Europe?

And the big question: how was this division able to depart for Hungary, well before the main body of the Russian army and taking a significant detour on its way to the Hungarian theater of war, when on April 6, 1849 the Czar had specified, in the initial phases of negotiations, two conditions of the military help he was prepared to offer the Austrian government: the Russian military forces would be substantial enough in number to achieve the desired goal (the suppression of the Hungarian forces) and they would not be integrated into the Austrian army. Nicholas I was consistently firm on these two points, and Paskevich was of the same view. And yet nonetheless, for the duration of the summer campaign Panyutin’s division fought alongside the Austrian Army under the command of Haynau.

The idea that perhaps Paskevich had not sent the division to Ungarisch Hradisch and indeed had never intended it to continue its journey from there on foot to the Hungarian border was never raised in the roughly seven decades following the suppression of the Hungarian revolution and war of independence because, given the fact that the official documents pertaining to the events were inaccessible, it hardly could have been raised. It seemed quite clear that from the outset the small town in Moravia had been the destination of the troop transport by rail. As one reads in the work of Wilhelm Rüstow, “since Austria has now urgently repeated its request, Paskiewitsch (...) has sent the Panutine division to Ungarisch Hradisch and Magyar Brody by the Cracow railway line,” and this contention is repeated by Mihály Horváth, Rikhárd Gelich and József Breit.

As they did not have access to the Austrian primary sources, Hungarian historians were unable to base their conclusions on anything other than observable facts and the work of lieutenant colonel W. Ramming, Haynau’s chief-of-staff, according to which “the 9th infantry division, under the command of Panyutin, was sent by rail from Cracow to Hradisch in order to provide reinforcements for the Austrian army.”
Ramming does not go into the unpleasant details (which I present in my dissertation), which were, given his position, unquestionably familiar to him, but his phrasing allows one to draw the conclusion that Hungarian historians drew.

After 1920, the Austrian primary sources were accessible, but scholars and historians did not really deal with the history of Panyutin’s division, as it was hardly regarded as a significant thread in the larger narrative of the uprising and its suppression. József Bánlaky (Breit) did not modify or revise the conclusion he had reached in the 1890s.

As far as I know, Lajos Steier was the first Hungarian historian to suggest that Paskevich sent Panyutin’s division to the region not to provide assistance to Vienna in the metaphorical sense (in other words meaning the Habsburg monarchy itself), but rather to safeguard the city itself. Having examined the primary sources pertaining to the Austrian Army, he made the following contention in his 1925 study on the circumstances of the deposition of the Habsburg House: “The Russian general Panyutin was invited by Welden to Göding and the Vág valley, but first he was sent to Vienna to defend the capital. The Warsaw command specified this, and Panyutin was absolutely unwilling to follow Welden’s order” (my emphasis). In his short essay on the Russian intervention in the struggle, which was published in 1933, Dénes Jánossy only notes the following: “Count Caboga had to use all of his persuasive powers to get Paskevich to send a few support troops to defend Vienna before the [main] Russian forces arrived.” According to Erzsébet Andics, without first obtaining the permission of the Czar, Paskevich dispatched an army corps, which “traveled through Prussian Silesia to Austria.” He does not indicate the precise destination.

According to a study by Austrian Rudolf Kiszling published in 1948, Paskevich sent Panyutin’s division, which numbered 12,000 men, to Ungarisch Hradisch.

The English historian Ian W. Roberts, whose monograph Nicholas I and the Russian Intervention in Hungary was published in 1991, examined documents in archives and libraries in London, Vienna, Copenhagen, and Stockholm and also drew on Russian secondary literature. He did not, however, have access to the Soviet archives. Thoroughly familiar with the Austrian primary sources (for instance reports made by lieutenant general in the Austrian Army Bernhard Caboga on March 6 and 8, 1849, which shed some light on the circumstances surrounding the dispatch of the division), he refers to the order given by Paskevich, according to which Panyutin’s division “was to be used only for the defense of Vienna; if this proved not to be
necessary, it was to be kept in reserve and not combined with other Austrian forces for operations elsewhere.” He then acquaints his reader with the details of the trip to Ungarisch Hradisch. He does not offer any remarks regarding why they stopped in the town, noting only that “by 15 May the threat to Vienna had passed, as the Hungarian army had not continued its expected advance on the capital” from Komárom.

According to the Russian secondary literature, Paskevich dispatched the division to Vienna because of a possible Hungarian threat to the Austrian capital without first obtaining permission from the Czar, but because of the change of circumstances he had it stop in Ungarisch Hradisch. In his biography of Paskevich, A. P. Sherbatov offers the following account of the division’s halt in the Moravian town: “what Schwarzenberg had feared did not come to pass: Görgey was not determined to attack Vienna. The Austrian army in the meantime had grown to 60,000 with the army corps of general Vogel, which had been brought from Western Galicia. When he learned of this, prince Paskevich ordered Panyutin to stop in Ungarisch Hradisch on the Morava River and remain behind the main body of the Austrian army, which at the time was in Nagyszombat by the Vág River.” In a monograph published in Saint Petersburg in 1880, I. I. Oreus, who wrote a history of the 1849 military campaign in Hungary, offers a persuasive analysis in broad strokes of Paskevich’s operations in Hungary that to this day stands its ground. He also provides an account of the dispatch of the division to Vienna in which he notes in a single sentence that the division was made to stop in Ungarisch Hradisch at Paskevich’s order.

In 1851, a publication was printed in Russian according to which the division was brought to a halt in Moravia not at Paskevich’s command (as asserted in the two aforementioned works), but rather by the Austrians. P. K. Menkov makes the following contention: “The plan was not to stop this detachment in Göding, but rather to send it on by rail either to Vienna to defend the capital or to Pressburg to serve as a reserve force for the Austrian army. (…) At the order of the Austrian commander-in-chief, the detachment was stopped at Ungarisch Hradisch.” Menkov’s work was published in Berlin in German the same year, and it was familiar to Hungarian and Austrian historians. However, this work, which reflects an official interpretation, was written under Paskevich’s strict oversight and with his approval. It is entirely understandable that scholars have regarded it with some reservations. One should mention the work by R. A. Averbuch, a Soviet Marxist historian, published in 1935 in Moscow. Averbuch examines the history of the Czar’s intervention against the Hungarian forces, offering
an accurate account of the dispatch of Panyutin’s division to Vienna, but he then contends that since the Hungarian forces turned back towards Buda, the danger to Vienna was averted, “and the struggles between the bourgeois groups prevented the liberation of Hungary.”

As far as I know, no Russian historians have systematically studied the wealth of materials in the Russian archives on the military intervention against Hungary in 1849. For a Russian military historian, this campaign, which was criticized by contemporaries, is probably not a terribly interesting topic, since it is perhaps overshadowed by the Crimean War, which constituted the real challenge and test of strength for military forces of the Russian Empire. Essays have been and still are being written on 1848 and 1849 by Russian historians, but they tend to address questions pertaining to political history, social history, and national minorities, or they concern the views of the officer corps of the intervening army or “the other Russia” (i.e. the world of unofficial Russia), and they build primarily on the findings of the existing secondary literature or sources that have already been published.

Sources consulted, working practices, and methodology

I was able to study this subject thanks to a Kuno Klebelsberg scholarship, which allowed me to pursue research in the Russian State Military Archive (Российский государственный военно-исторический архив) in Moscow. Of the material I found here, I drew primarily on the following: the letters and submissions written by Paskevich to Nicholas I in April and the first half of May, 1849; Paskevich’s correspondence with Prince A. I. Chernisov, the Minister of Defense; the reports of general F. F. Berg, who was sent to Vienna as a liaison to the Austrian government, and the orders he gave to Panyutin; the reports of captain A. D. Gerstenzweig, Nicholas I’s aide-de-camp; the operational diary of the 3rd infantry army corps and Panyutin’s division; the division’s registers on its numbers and the number of ill; the letters written by colonel K. R. Semyakin to his wife; and the writings of the division quartermaster, S. P. Kopev.

Of the materials I found in the Kriegsarchiv department of the Austrian State Archive, I drew on the documents from May and June, 1849 of the main Army, which was under the command of field marshals Ludwig von Welden and then
Haynau. Again, I was able to pursue this research thanks to a Klebelsberg scholarship.

Several of the officers in the division kept diaries and wrote memoirs: colonel A. K. Baumgarten’s diary, which published in 1910–11, has been available in Hungarian since 2012. B. Luginski’s was published in 1855 in Russian. The diary of the Polish W. Tomasewicz, who wrote in his mother tongue, survives in manuscript form, and it was published in 2010 by T. Epsztejn in Warsaw. The diary of captain Aleksejenko was also published in Hungarian.

In the course of my work I drew on Austrian source works that had already been published, the reports of the Austrian Council of Ministers, and Polish memoirs in which one finds accounts of the arrival of the Russians in Galicia (K. Girtler, F. Hechel). In addition to works on the railway network that was used for troop transports, I found the monograph by Burkhard Köster entitled *Militär und Eisenbahn in der Habsburgermonarchie 1825–1859* particularly useful. Alongside Russian and Austrian sources on the stationing of the Russian soldiers in Moravia, I also consulted an essay by Czech historian Lukáš Čoupek entitled *Revoluce 1848–1849 a Uherské Hradiště*, the relevant chapters from two volumes on the history of Ungarisch Hradisch, and contemporary reports that were published in *Morawské Nowiny*, a periodical printed in Brünn.

In the dissertation, which consists of a preface, eight chapters, and a concluding summary, I strove to compare the official Russian documents recently made available with the official Austrian documents, find possible explanations for the apparent contradictions, demonstrate the interrelationships between the dates given and the times when decisions were made, and present a sketch, to the extent possible, of the micro-history behind the great power politics by drawing on the narratives sources and reconstructing the chronological order of events.

**Findings**

Both Nicolas I and Paskevich thought in terms of “forceful, all-enveloping” armed intervention, and indeed in the wake of the Austrian defeats they increasingly regarded it as prudent to consider the use of ever larger forces. In other words, the idea of sending a small, independent detachment such as Panyutin’s to a side theater of the war in no way figured among their ideas. It is quite understandable that, given the
failure of the two relatively small Russian columns that had been sent to Transylvania in the winter, they rejected the idea – urged by the Austrians – of partial intervention. In the initial phases of the negotiations, it seemed expedient to them to occupy at most Galicia and Bukovina, and indeed I touch on their motives for this in my dissertation.

I have shown that the Russian decision-makers kept close watch on the events of the struggle between the Hungarians, who were fighting first for self-government within the Habsburg Monarchy and then for independence, and the Austrians. As I found the letters and reports that were written by Paskevich to the Czar during this period in the Russian military archive and the letters that were written by Nicholas I to Paskevich are already familiar to historians, I was able to reconstruct the dialogue between the two. As I have established on the basis of the sources, on April 19, 1849 Paskevich asked the Czar to grant him permission to dispatch his troops to Hungary immediately, in other words at a time when the Austrian Army was still in the vicinity of Pest and indeed found itself in a defensive position. On April 25, the Czar, who was in Moscow at the time, replied, giving Paskevich permission to dispatch the 3rd and 4th army corps, with general F. V. Rüdiger, the commander of the 3rd corps, at its head if an official request were to be made by the Austrian government. The Czar agreed to allow the 4th army corps to occupy Galicia and the reinforced 3rd corps to invade Hungary through the Dukla Pass. On April 30, news of Nicholas’ authorization arrived in Warsaw, where in the meantime news of the Austrian Council of Ministers’ April 21 request for assistance had also arrived. (I have noted that, following the April 3 sitting, when the Austrian ministers decided against seeking armed assistance from Russia, the question was not raised by the Austrian Council of Ministers until April 21, in spite of the fact that in the intervening time there had been a total of eight sittings. On only one occasion was the possibility raised of requesting “foreign” assistance, were it to become necessary. At this point, Prime Minister Prince Felix Schwarzenberg personally oversaw the intense negotiations.)

I also draw attention to the fact that Nicholas I gave permission for the dispatch of armed forces when the Hungarian capital was still under the control of the Austrian army. We know that, in contrast, the Austrian Council of Ministers only requested immediate assistance from the Russian ruler when the city had been emptied. I pointed out that in an analysis of the decisions that were made in rapid succession, one must take into consideration the difficulties of maintaining communication: the governmental centers, i.e. Vienna, Olmütz (today Olomouc in the Czech Republic),
and Warsaw, were connected by railway, and there was an optical telegraph running between Warsaw and Saint Petersburg, but communications between Moscow and Warsaw and Moscow and Saint Petersburg had to be entrusted to messengers, which drastically reduced the pace at which news and reports could be delivered. Furthermore, the Czar spent most of April, the month in which many of the events transpired that required quick decision-making, in Moscow.

The Russian troops would not have been able to set out for the territory of the Austrian empire had Paskevich not already prepared them to do so. In the second chapter, I examine the steps that were taken by Paskevich in order to do this, including first and foremost the movements of the detachments that later came under Panyutin’s command. I briefly examine how, as a result of restructuring that was done in 1830/31, the so-called active army (Действующая армия) was created in order to ensure more effective measures against the Polish freedom fight. This army was to remain under Paskevich’s command from 1831 until his death in 1855. This explains why Nicholas I consulted him on every question pertaining to the military campaign abroad, and indeed why the Austrian government regularly sought his council, even when the possibility of Paskevich serving as the leader of the forces in the Russian intervention had not been raised. And historians have long known that Nicholas I had particularly strong confidence in Paskevich, who served as the regent of the Polish Kingdom, and Paskevich’s opinion on European politics was important to him.

The first formations of the advanced guard of the 3rd army corps arrived in Cracow on May 5. As commander of the advance guard, on May 6 lieutenant general Panyutin arrived in the city and then set out again in order to make a strategically dramatic appearance near Jordanów, by the pass in the Carpathian Mountains, at the head of a detachment. He intended to threaten the Hungarians and also to draw their attention away from the fact that the main Russian forces were gathering at Dukla. Drawing on Polish memoires, I present first impressions of the Russian armies, which were crossing Galicia towards Hungary.

In the last days of April and the first of May, the Austrian government decided that the Austrian capital and indeed the empire itself were in a state of crisis. Vienna assumed that the Hungarian forces would pursue Welden’s retreating army, which had lost all self-confidence. This assumption caused considerable uneasiness among the political and military leaders of the Austrian empire. It seemed possible that if the theater of war were to be near the capital of the empire, the Austrian troops, who were
in a state of disarray, might not be capable of bringing the enemy to a halt. The Austrian commander-in-chief, who had suffered psychological collapse in the wake of the defeats, did not think he would be able to stop the Hungarian army, which was pressing forward, and therefore tried ever more despairingly to hasten the arrival of Russian military assistance. The Russian general Berg, who had been sent to Vienna to serve as a liaison to the Austrian government, also reported on the dire state of the Austrian army.

As I have shown in my work, the manner in which the representatives of a European great power, more specifically the Austrian empire, conducted themselves in Warsaw at the time in front of the representatives of an allied great power was without precedent. As the English consul in Warsaw reported to the foreign minister, “[t]here seems no end to the solicitations sent hither for immediate assistance, and the Russian Officers even begin to ridicule this kind of invasion of Poland by the Austrian employés.” According to an account given by Paskevich to Nicholas I, Count Bernhard Caboga, the Austrian lieutenant general, “tearfully pleaded that we provide help for the capital as soon as possible, as for his homeland this would be the most gracious possible good deed.”

And while in the first half of April Schwarzenberg waited in Transylvania in the eastern half of the empire for partial Russian military assistance, by the end of the month the arrival of a Russian military column in the Vág Valley hardly seemed sufficient to halt Hungarian advances. It was the hope of the Austrian Prime Minister that within a short period of time a Russian support army would arrive in the western half of the empire that would pose a threat to the right wing of the Hungarian army, which the Austrians feared was pressing on towards Vienna. The new means of travel of the era, the railway, would be used to ensure the rapid transport of the Russian support army requested by the Austrians, which would consist of 25,000 soldiers. However, the railway line from Cracow went through Prussian Silesia to Göding in Moravia, which was the intended destination. Thus assistance could arrive in a matter of days and could continue onward towards the Hungarian border. Schwarzenberg established contact with the Prussian government, which immediately gave its consent for the transport of the Russian troops across Prussian territory.

I determined that Paskevich continued to adhere to his initial vision, in other words to the idea he had discussed with the Czar and which had won the Czar’s approval: the Russian army would invade Hungary in large numbers through the
Dukla Mountain Pass. On May 6, he turned a deaf ear to any talk of sending a small auxiliary force by railway, a venture he regarded as risky, and he waited for the arrival of the Czar from Warsaw. That evening, however, the assessment of the situation made by Schwarzenberg and the Austrian Minister of Defense on May 4 arrived: the capital of the empire could fall into the hands of the “insurrectionaries,” the tragic consequences of which it was not necessary to describe in detail. No longer was it a question of suppressing the Hungarian uprising, it was now a question of saving the Austrian state. Under such circumstances, the concentration of forces at Dukla and the invasion of the country from there (which the Austrians were compelled to admit would only be possible in the latter third of the month of May) by no means would be sufficient. Every day, indeed every hour was precious. In order to save Vienna, immediate assistance was necessary, and the preparations for the transport of the Russian support troops by train had already been made.

Influenced by the urgings of the Austrians and compelled to confront the looming possibility of losing Vienna to the Hungarians, in the course of a few troubled hours on the night of May 6 Paskevich adopted the stance he himself had emphasized many times before. Acting without the prior permission of the Czar, he dispatched the division, consisting of 14,500 men and 48 pieces of artillery, but not to Moravia, as the Austrians had requested, but rather to Vienna and, if it were to prove necessary, onward to the main Austrian forces in Pozsony. The division was not as large in number as the Austrians had requested, but it was still a considerable force: it was almost as big as a corps of the Austrian Army, and it was definitely larger than a Hungarian army corps. Panyutin was ordered to turn over command of the Jordanów detachment that was on its way towards the Carpathians to lieutenant general G. Ch. Zassz and turn back towards Cracow and assume command of the infantry division which had been assembled out of the detachments that had already arrived in the city. This infantry division was then supposed to begin loading its equipment into train cars and set out on May 9 and the following days for the Austrian capital. In order to ensure rapid travel, they were to take only minimal provisions and minimal ammunitions, and as few horses as possible, without the cavalry itself or the service corps.

Thus in Paskevich’s estimate, immediate assistance could save the Austrian capital. If Vienna in the meantime were to fall, the division could turn back, at least this was how he attempted to reassure Nicholas I in a letter he wrote the next day in which he provided a detailed account of the decision he had taken under the pressure
of the increasingly critical circumstances. The Czar, however, was exasperated by the news, and concerned for the fate of Panyutin’s forces. Paskevich unquestionably assumed that the arrival of the division in the Austrian capital would have an effect on the course of the war that would later win him the Czar’s approval. He was incorrect.

As I make clear in my inquiry, in the period just before Panyutin’s division was dispatched, Paskevich, acting on the basis of a series of troubling reports made by the Austrians, suggested to the Czar that, in order to save Vienna, it would be prudent to dispatch a strong army column with Rüdiger at its head not to the Dukla Pass, but rather in the direction of Trencsén (today Trenčín in Slovakia), like something of a knife in the back of the Hungarian army, which was advancing in the direction of the Austrian capital. Nicholas I, however, stuck to his original view.

In the 4th chapter, in which I present details concerning the railway network in question, I examine how, as a result of Russian, Prussian, and Austrian collaboration, the division traveled by rail from Cracow to Ungarisch Hradisch. As B. Köster, one of the aforementioned scholars of the topic, has noted, this troop transport by rail was one of the milestones in history of the use of the railway for military purposes. This is true in part simply because of the number of troops who were moved, but also because it involved the coordination and cooperation of three railway companies. It was also a milestone in the military history of the Russian Empire: it was the first time the railway was used to transport Russian troops to a theater of war. The first trains from Cracow were only able to depart on May 10, one day later than had originally been planned. Between May 10 and 15, according to the report submitted by the Austrian colonel overseeing the transport, 189 officers and 13,749 soldiers (in other words 13,938 men) were taken from Cracow to Ungarisch Hradisch, along with 977 horses, 48 pieces of artillery, 167 cars of ammunition and baggage, and 88 cattle. On May 15, by which time it had become quite clear even to the Russians that the division would remain in Ungarisch Hradisch for some time, the service corps set off on foot across Galicia to Ostrau, where the cars and horses were put on the train and taken onward to Ungarisch Hradisch. This transport, which involved 8 officers, 586 soldiers, 1,016 (1,029?) horses, and 297 (298) cars, took place on May 18–21. I found confirmation of these data, which were first brought to light by Köster, primarily in Russian sources, and I also discovered additional related data.

Familiarizing my reader with the circumstances of the stationing of the division in Ungarisch Hradisch, I draw attention to the fact that on May 9, when the Austrian
The government was notified of the fact that the support troops were traveling to Vienna by train, Schwarzenberg did not give Berg the reply he had expected, but rather claimed that the Austrian forces would be capable of protecting the capital and thus it would be prudent to have the Russian division halt in Göding, from where it could advance towards the Vág and pose a threat to the enemy’s right wing. In other words, in accordance with the initial Austrian plans (and no longer fearful that the Hungarian forces actually threatened Vienna), Schwarzenberg stopped the advance of the Russian forces (not in Göding, but in Ungarisch Hradisch) before it had not even departed from Cracow. Later, the Austrians also claimed that there were not enough barracks in Vienna to ensure lodging for the troops and it would be difficult to provide provisions for the Russian soldiers and the recently reinforced Austrian army. They added that it would also be desirable, given the military operations that had been planned, to have a suitable cavalry sent for the division as well.

When he learned of all this, Paskevich was outraged, and he let his anger out on general Berg, who, given that he was on the territory of the Austrian state, could hardly do anything other than submit to the request of the Austrian government. However, had Paskevich better anticipated the events, clearly he never would have sent the division without the necessary cavalry escort to ensure its safety, without its service corps and with only enough provisions for a few days. In other words, Paskevich regarded Vienna as the destination, not the small town in Moravia. The events prompted him to be extremely cautious and thus slowed down the decision-making process regarding Russian intervention in the conflict.

The first trains bearing detachments of the Russian division arrived in the station in Ungarisch Hradisch on May 11. Panyutin was taken aback, because the interruption in their journey constituted a violation of the order he had been given by Paskevich, but he had little choice in the matter, as one can read in his operational diary: “they did not have any additional means of transport.” He assumed that the situation would be cleared up in a matter of days and that the brief stop would not have any serious consequences with regards to “averting the threat to Vienna.” However, a matter of days grew into a longer period of compelled respite. Panyutin and his troops found themselves almost trapped. By shedding light on these details, I have provided an explanation as to why Panyutin rejected the requests of the Austrian commander-in-chief each and every time he called on him to take part in the counter-attack he had planned.
The Russians who were temporarily stationed in Ungarisch Hradisch and the surrounding villages enjoyed their time in the comparatively restful setting. They soon understood the Slavic language spoken by the locals, and the people of the area welcomed them. The efforts that had been made by Cyril and Methodus, the two apostles of Slavic culture, to convert people to the Orthodox Church strengthened the mutual sense of brotherhood. As noted in the one of the Czech sources on which I drew, the presence of the Russian troops in the area “led to a significant spread of the ideas of Pan-Slavism among the Czech speaking population.”

In the end, the fate of the division was determined by a decision made on May 21 during a meeting between Franz Joseph I and Nicholas I. The division was put at the disposal of the Austrian commander-in-chief with the stipulation that Panyutin’s troops would remain alongside the main body of the Austrian army until the Russian army arrived to the theater of war. It would then rejoin the Russian army.

Panyutin’s division departed from Ungarisch Hradisch on May 26, setting out for the Hungarian border. It traveled through Ungarisch Brod, Vágújhely (today Nové Mesto nad Váhom, Slovakia), and Nagyszombat, arriving in Pozsony on June 3 and 4. In the seventh chapter of my dissertation I trace the path taken by the division in this stage of its travels, during which it had the protection of two lancer-squadrons of Austrian cavalry. I also examine the reception of the division in Pozsony, the circumstances regarding the lodgings that were provided for the soldiers, and the splendid lunch that held in the Redoute chamber on June 7 by the Austrian allies as a tribute to the Russians. However, the festivities were cut short when a cholera epidemic broke out, which in its early stages left more than one-hundred men bedridden per day. On the basis of the registers, 41% of the people suffering from cholera died in a relatively short period of time. On June 8, Haynau issued orders concerning the transfer of the Russian soldiers to the surrounding cities and villages, and as a consequence of these measures the epidemic subsided, though the disease continued to plague the division.

In the period of time in question, decisions were made that were important to the Austrians, the Hungarians, and the Russians, decisions that had a decisive impact on the Hungarian uprising. One such decision was the sudden dispatch of Panyutin’s division in response to the assumed advance of the Hungarian army on Vienna. The transport of the division from Cracow to Ungarisch Hradisch should unquestionably be seen as one of the great success stories in the history of the railway, but even with
well-organized transport operations neither the Russians nor the Austrians would have reached their immediate goals, for there were two different goals. Paskevich sent the division to Vienna, but the division never arrived in the Austrian capital. With regards to this supporting force, the Austrians were thinking of Moravia as the destination from the outset. From there they hoped to send the division on towards the Vág. However, Panyutin did not leave Ungarisch Hradisch precisely because the destination, as far as he was concerned, had been changed and, furthermore, he had brought only minimal provisions and had no cavalry to provide protection for the infantry men. Thus for a time the division could not be used for any goal. Indeed, it was not entirely clear whose command it was under, and under these circumstances Panyutin had little choice but to await orders from his Russian superiors.

The decision that was made on April 29 by an ad hoc Hungarian war council in Komárom also had a decisive influence on the course of events and ultimately the outcome of the uprising. According to this decision, the vast majority of the Hungarian military forces set out not for Vienna, but for Buda in order to free the Hungarian capital. The Austrian government and military leadership, however, had assumed they would do the exact opposite, i.e. they would advance on the Austrian capital, and so they urged the Russians to provide assistance, in light of the direct threat to Vienna posed (they feared) by the Hungarians. Had Vienna actually faced the threat of a Hungarian attack, would the Austrian government have set aside its original plans and taken the risk of having the Russian division stop in Moravia? Or would it have taken advantage of the assistance sent by Paskevich in order to ensure the defense of the capital? These questions remain open. Today we have data concerning the sizes of the two opposing forces, thus we know that the Hungarian forces, had they advanced westward, would have faced the numerically superior Austrian Army, not to mention, perhaps, Panyutin’s division as well.

In conclusion, I provide a brief overview of the operations of the division in Hungary. Panyutin’s troops fought throughout the summer of 1849 alongside Haynau’s army, and they played various roles in the skirmishes and battles, sometimes larger, sometimes smaller, but never negligible. The division was only reintegrated into the formation of the 3rd Russian army corps following the surrender at Világos (today Şiria, Romania) on August 13 and the capitulation in Arad (today Arad, Romania) on August 17. As I observe in my dissertation, the Russian division constituted a third of the forces at Haynau’s disposal in the decisive battle of Temesvár (today Timișoara in Romania) on
August 9. It is thus understandable that throughout the summer the Austrian commander-in-chief strove to prevent the division from rejoining the Russian army and also deliberately avoided meeting with Paskevich. Thus Paskevich’s initial intentions notwithstanding, in the end Panyutin’s division helped Haynau win significant victories and thereby contributed to the defeat of the Hungarian war of independence.

**Publications relevant to the theme of the dissertation**


– „... ki kezeskedhet azért, hogy a magyarok egyébként nem foglalják el Bécset.” Panyutyin altábornagy hadosztályának elindítása az osztrák fővároshoz. The manuscript has been accepted by the editorship of Hadtörténelmi Közlemények.